1. "What is Masculinity?" in Synthese (forthcoming)
This paper initiates analytic inquiry into the metaphysics of masculinity. I argue that individual masculinities (such as clone masculinity and incel masculinity) are distinct homeostatic property cluster kinds related to gender structures via processes of adherence, failed adherence, selective adherence, and/or reinterpretation with respect to male-coded social norms.
2. "Queer and Straight" in the Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Sex (2022)
Recent philosophical work on sexuality has focused primarily on sexual orientation. Yet, there’s another normatively significant phenomenon in the neighborhood: sexual identity. Here, I develop a cultural theory of queer and straight sexual identity. In particular, I argue that sexual identity is a matter of inclusion/exclusion in relation to queer and straight cultures, which are differentiated in terms of characteristic practices involving kinship and political resistance.
3. "Nonbinary Design" in the Boston Review (2022)
4. "Public Health, Political Solidarity, and the Ethics of Orientation Ascriptions" in Ergo (2022)
How ought we socially to categorize individuals with respect to sexual orientation? In this paper, I engage with philosophical work on the foundations of political solidarity as well as public health research on the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS in order to develop a categorization scheme conducive to the normatively important aims of LGBTQIA+ social movements.
5. "The Sexual Orientation/Identity Distinction" in Hypatia (2021)
The sex/gender distinction is a staple of feminist philosophy. In slogan form: sex is “natural,” while gender is the “social meaning” of sex. Considering the importance of the sex/gender distinction—which, here, I neither endorse nor reject—it’s interesting to ask if philosophers working on the metaphysics of sexuality might make use of an analogous distinction. In this paper, I argue that we ought to endorse the sexual orientation/identity distinction. In particular, I argue that the orientation/identity distinction is indispensable to normative explanations regarding LGBTQIA+ resistance and oppression. As a case study, I consider the oppression involved in the gentrification of historic queer neighborhoods.
6. "Sexual Orientation, Ideology, and Philosophical Method" in the Journal of Social Ontology (2020)
Here, I examine the epistemic relation between beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation (e.g., beliefs concerning whether orientation is dispositional) and beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories (e.g., beliefs concerning whether polyamorous is an orientation category). Current philosophical research gives epistemic priority to the former class of beliefs, such that beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories tend to be jettisoned or revised in cases of conflict with beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation. Yet, considering the influence of ideology on beliefs about socially significant phenomena, I argue for an epistemic reversal.
7. "Review of Ásta's Categories We Live By" with Elizabeth Barnes in Mind (2019)
8. "Gender Identity and Exclusion: A Reply to Jenkins" in Ethics (2017)
A theory of gender ought to be compatible with trans-inclusive definitions of gender identity terms, such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’. Appealing to this principle of trans-inclusion, Katharine Jenkins argues that we ought to endorse a dual social position and identity theory of gender. Here, I argue that Jenkins’s dual theory of gender fails to be trans-inclusive for the following reasons: (i) it cannot generate a definition of ‘woman’ that extends to include all trans women, and (ii) it understands transgender gender identity through a cisgender frame.
This paper initiates analytic inquiry into the metaphysics of masculinity. I argue that individual masculinities (such as clone masculinity and incel masculinity) are distinct homeostatic property cluster kinds related to gender structures via processes of adherence, failed adherence, selective adherence, and/or reinterpretation with respect to male-coded social norms.
2. "Queer and Straight" in the Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Sex (2022)
Recent philosophical work on sexuality has focused primarily on sexual orientation. Yet, there’s another normatively significant phenomenon in the neighborhood: sexual identity. Here, I develop a cultural theory of queer and straight sexual identity. In particular, I argue that sexual identity is a matter of inclusion/exclusion in relation to queer and straight cultures, which are differentiated in terms of characteristic practices involving kinship and political resistance.
3. "Nonbinary Design" in the Boston Review (2022)
4. "Public Health, Political Solidarity, and the Ethics of Orientation Ascriptions" in Ergo (2022)
How ought we socially to categorize individuals with respect to sexual orientation? In this paper, I engage with philosophical work on the foundations of political solidarity as well as public health research on the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS in order to develop a categorization scheme conducive to the normatively important aims of LGBTQIA+ social movements.
5. "The Sexual Orientation/Identity Distinction" in Hypatia (2021)
The sex/gender distinction is a staple of feminist philosophy. In slogan form: sex is “natural,” while gender is the “social meaning” of sex. Considering the importance of the sex/gender distinction—which, here, I neither endorse nor reject—it’s interesting to ask if philosophers working on the metaphysics of sexuality might make use of an analogous distinction. In this paper, I argue that we ought to endorse the sexual orientation/identity distinction. In particular, I argue that the orientation/identity distinction is indispensable to normative explanations regarding LGBTQIA+ resistance and oppression. As a case study, I consider the oppression involved in the gentrification of historic queer neighborhoods.
6. "Sexual Orientation, Ideology, and Philosophical Method" in the Journal of Social Ontology (2020)
Here, I examine the epistemic relation between beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation (e.g., beliefs concerning whether orientation is dispositional) and beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories (e.g., beliefs concerning whether polyamorous is an orientation category). Current philosophical research gives epistemic priority to the former class of beliefs, such that beliefs about the taxonomy of orientation categories tend to be jettisoned or revised in cases of conflict with beliefs about the nature of sexual orientation. Yet, considering the influence of ideology on beliefs about socially significant phenomena, I argue for an epistemic reversal.
7. "Review of Ásta's Categories We Live By" with Elizabeth Barnes in Mind (2019)
8. "Gender Identity and Exclusion: A Reply to Jenkins" in Ethics (2017)
A theory of gender ought to be compatible with trans-inclusive definitions of gender identity terms, such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’. Appealing to this principle of trans-inclusion, Katharine Jenkins argues that we ought to endorse a dual social position and identity theory of gender. Here, I argue that Jenkins’s dual theory of gender fails to be trans-inclusive for the following reasons: (i) it cannot generate a definition of ‘woman’ that extends to include all trans women, and (ii) it understands transgender gender identity through a cisgender frame.